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Force during the Clinton
administration
Gestion de la défense après la fin de l’Histoire : Une Conversation avec Robert F.




1 Robert  F.  Hale  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force  (Financial  Management  and
Comptroller) for the majority of the Clinton administration. In this conversation he offers
perspectives on a variety of important topics for 1990s defense management, from the
specifics  of  financial  management  reform in  an  era  of  declining  budgets  to  broader
questions of justifying the military after the Cold War. Political considerations ranging
from the structural (Senate confirmations) to the specific (changing balance of defense
dollars with the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress) round out the discussion.
 
Note on the transcription
2 This interview was taken by Michael Stricof on 13 September 2016 at the Booz Allen
Hamilton offices in McLean, Virginia. This is a slightly modified transcript of the original
recorded interview. Some sentences were cleaned up for clarity when reading, however
these were minimal modifications not intended to eliminate the sense of spoken word.
Redactions  have  been  made  at  the  request  of  the  interviewee.  Footnotes  appear  as
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occasional explanatory notes for potentially obscure references, while frequently used
abbreviations are defined in brackets. Some off-topic chatter between the interviewer
and interviewee, especially at the beginning and end of the recording was not included.
 
Interview with Robert F. Hale
3 [Michael Stricof] (Q): Thank you for sitting down with me. Normally, I just ask you to
introduce yourself and give me your background, education, and then we’ll move from
there.
4 Robert  Hale (A):  I’m Bob Hale.  Professional  background:  I  worked for  Congress  for  a
number of years in the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], then moved to the Department
of Defense [DoD] as the Air Force comptroller in 1994, which I think is the focus of this
discussion.  I  had some time outside of  government,  heading the American Society of
Military Comptrollers for a while, but then went back as DoD's comptroller in 2009. I
stayed there until 2014, and then came here to Booz Allen. I have a Bachelor's degree
from  Stanford,  a  Master’s  degree  also  from  Stanford  and  an  MBA  from  George
Washington University.
5 Q: How did you get started in public service, originally?
6 A: I grew up on a fruit farm in California and that was about as far from the military and
public service as I think you could be. But, I graduated from Stanford in the middle of the
Vietnam War and there were sort of two choices: you could go to Canada or you could go
in the military. So, I joined the Navy and they got me back to Washington, DC where I met
my wife. Like so many career things it was happenstance that brought me into public
service. But that said, it’s been a great career and I'm certainly glad I ended up being back
here.
7 Q: How did you get started working for the CBO?
8 A: I was working—The Navy kicked me out, having essentially drafted me; I wasn't drafted
but effectively drafted as a volunteer; then the Vietnam war ended—I went to work for
the Center for Naval Analyses, a think tank organization here. I was kind of bored and
frankly I saw a write-up of the new Congressional Budget Office in Business Week and said,
“this is worth trying,” so I sent them a resume, and they hired me.
9 Q: This was the late seventies?
10 A: This was 1975, the year that the organization was created. I was one of its charter
members or close to.
11 Q: Can you tell me a bit about the process for becoming Air Force comptroller?
12 A: Well, CBO got me involved in defense financial management and in policy analysis. But
I wanted to be somewhere where I could manage something and do something about it as
opposed to writing about it. CBO is basically a staff support agency, and it’s a great place
to  work  but  I  wanted  to  do  something  else.  I  had  had  my  eye  out  for  a  political
appointment for a while. It was a period of time where the Republicans were doing well
and I'm a Democrat so I spent a long time at CBO, longer than I had planned. But when
the opportunity came around I was actively looking for a job in DoD.
13 Q: Who did you contact then?
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14 A: At the political level it’s more that they contact you. I had friends who I had worked
with, in particular John Hamre who was the [DoD] comptroller in the early part of the Bill
Clinton administration. I think it was him that brought me over, really.
15 Q: Can you tell me a bit about the appointment process? It seems like there was a gap
between your service at CBO and the Air Force.
16 A: It’s—I would say it's exciting, chaotic and frustrating. First off, it was a long time before
the White House and DoD made up their mind to offer me this position. It always takes
time, but it took a long time, in that case. The election was in ’92; Clinton of course was
inaugurated in early ’93. They didn't contact me until October of ’93 and even then it took
about 5 months to get confirmed. You know, some of it’s  just waiting around. These
aren't,  you know,  positions that  are at  the highest level,  so they don't  always move
quickly and Congress took a while to get a hearing. Then, a Senator Ford who was from
Tennessee at the time decided he wanted more C-130 aircraft—they’re little prop planes
that fly stuff around for the military—and a guard base in Tennessee. So he put a hold on
my nomination saying, “If the department could get me more C-130s he'd let me go.” That
took several months, so all in all, I wasn't actually sworn in until March of ’94.
17 Q: Did he get the C-130s?
18 A: I think he did. Yes. I mean, he had holds on all the DoD people, as did others. And they
sort of brought them all together on one person and then I think basically made a deal.
19 Q: As comptroller for the Air Force then your primary work was preparing a budget
estimate, or do I have that wrong?
20 A: Well, you have overall policy guidance for financial management in the Air Force, so
it's more than the budget, although that's the primary job. It's overseeing the budget
process that involves much of the Air Force and including levels above me up to the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff. But you're also responsible for the day to
day financial management, including work on things like auditable financial statements.
And you’re kind of a daddy rabbit for a career force, which was at that time about 10,000
people, as I recall, all spread out around the world doing financial management for the
Air Force. They're not working for the Assistant Secretary directly, but you're kind of the
head dog for that policy, so I did a lot of traveling to Air Force bases.
21 Q: When you were finally confirmed what were the major issues that you had to deal with
right away?
22 A: Well, the budget is always the major one that faces any comptroller. It's got a laid out
process, I don't know if you want to get into now or later?
23 Q: We can get into it.
24 A: So the Air Force, and all the services and OSD for that matter, have a pretty extensive
process for putting together budgets. It starts at their bases, which do operating budgets,
essentially. Then it flows up to their major commands where the issues get broader and
bigger.  There's  a  committee  that  reviews  and  makes  recommendations  then  the
Commander makes recommendations to headquarters and then there're several review
committees including a senior one that I  served on personally while I  was in the Air
Force. 
25  The senior level review committee makes a recommendation to the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of  the Air Force,  and they make the final decision.  But then the Air Force
budget goes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, along with all the other services and
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agencies, and there's a fairly extensive review process that I headed when I was OSD
comptroller that puts together an overall budget and that eventually goes to the Office of
Management and the Budget [OMB] and they incorporate it in the President's budget. 
26  It is a lengthy process. The long term planning can start as much as two years before the
budget is really put together. But there is a focus on the budget for about a year before
it's submitted and then there's a Congressional review and finally the execution.
27  The Air Force was coming down sharply in size, and the Cold War had effectively ended
in 1989. I looked up the numbers and in 1988 the Air Force had 576,000 people on active
duty. By the time I came in in 1994 that was down to 426,000 and when I left in 2000 it was
about 350,000. So they were coming down, not quite half, but probably by 40%. In that
period there was also a lot of effort to figure out what their mission was in the post-Cold
War era. None of that was really clear in the early 90s. I think it has kind of shaken out by
now. I remember when I was working at the Congressional Budget Office in 1989 when
the wall came down, my boss there said, "Well, what are you going to do now we won't
need a military anymore." I wish he had been right. Hasn't worked out that way. So, the
issues, the major ones were how do you do the drawdown?1 How far do you go? What do
you keep? I wasn't making all those decisions, by any means, but I was participating in
the process as they were being made. 
28  I also realized that the 1994 Congress passed a law that DoD has pretty much ignored
until  recently requiring auditable financial  statements for  all  major federal  agencies,
called  the  Government  Management  and  Reform  Act.  The  Air  Force  wasn't  doing
anything, and DoD wasn't doing anything. I tried to get started, and there was a lot of
pressure on the department to do something. Trying to get started in the Air Force, I had
mixed success at best. DoD still doesn't have auditable statements, but I had more success
as OSD comptroller because I had a lot more power. Still, I spent a fair amount of time on
the financial management side in the 1990s. It was a workforce that was kind of dispirited
because of all the drawdowns. They were getting smaller; people were being let go. As I
said, I did a fair amount of traveling. This also served to reassure the workforce that the
Air Force was going to be there. It'd be smaller and their organizations would be smaller
but the mission still remained.
29  Those were the major legs of the stool of my efforts as Air Force comptroller.
30 Q: Getting into the drawdown then. Had most of the major decisions been basically made
before you took office?
31 A: No. Some of them certainly had. As I said, they'd come down by one hundred and some
odd thousand. Which meant getting rid of a lot of units. But they had another roughly
100,000 to go, or 70-80,000 to go. And that occurred during the 90s. The 90s were a tough
period. Bill Clinton's focus wasn't on the military. He was definitely a domestic president.
I won't say he ignored the military, he didn't, but it wasn't his focus, and it wasn't his
budgetary focus, either. So we were making budget cuts for most of the early portion of
my tenure in the Air Force, before they mostly leveled off toward the end. We had large
surpluses by that point so there wasn't the same budgetary pressure. And it was clear the
military  was  underfunded.  We  weren't  spending  enough  on  the  bases,  we  weren't
modernizing to the degree that was needed. Needs were arising, so the budget leveled off.
Still,  it  never really grew much during the [late]  Clinton years.  Of  course 9/11 came
shortly after he left and they soared.
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32 Q: Right. In terms of decision-making: you just said that while you had something of a
role, it wasn't so much in a decision-making capacity. In terms of what would be cut and
when, how were these decisions ultimately being made? It wasn't the primary focus of the
administration, but there had to be efforts coming from somewhere.
33 A: Well, no, they were being made. The Department is huge; the Department of Defense is
a huge organization. The Air Force is huge. It’s got thousands of decisions made in a kind
of pyramid manner, if you will. At the bottom of the pyramid you’ve got the bases and
some of the major commands making a lot of the smaller decisions about how much
they're going to fly for training and where. Certainly those kinds of operational decisions
were made outside the Pentagon.  When it  gets  to the headquarters of  the Air  Force
they're more worried, I think, about the modernization program: how does it all add up,
because it's usually adding up to more than the likely budget for the Air Force, so they’ve
got to start trimming. This is certainly one of their major goals, along with any large
changes  of  direction.  Although  by  ’94  they  were  already  heading  in  the  drawdown
direction, so I wouldn’t say there were any large changes. 
34  So, the smaller decisions get made by the bases and the major commands. The medium
sized ones at the Air Force level. And the big issues get made by the Secretary of Defense
during the review, at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
35 Q: How often are these reviews undertaken?
36 A: Every year. They do an annual budget and a 5-year plan, but the focus is on the first
year of the 5-year plan, which is the budget year. So it is an ongoing process and in fact a
heavily overlapped process. As I said, the early planning for the budget starts at least two
years before it’s  even submitted to Congress,  so you're working on multiple budgets
simultaneously. Not to mention the fact that you're executing a budget at the same time.
There’s a fair amount of money moving around, and the comptroller gets pretty heavily
involved in responding to that. Then you get things like the Bosnian conflict, and you
know, certain commands are going to need more money. You usually can't just do that,
you have to go back to Congress and ask them for authority to move the money. So
there's a fair amount of internal or execution kind of work going on, much of which is
done by the comptroller organization. 
37 Q: Getting into Congress then: what pressures were you feeling, either directly or flowing
down from higher up the hierarchy from Congress in this period?
38 A: Well, Congress was of two minds. There were a number who were quite happy with the
drawdown. It freed up funds for what a number of especially Democrats viewed as higher
priorities in the domestic arena. But, as cracks started to appear, as readiness wasn't what
it might have been, as the bases weren't being maintained as well as they should be, I
think,  especially  some  of  the  Republicans  started  pushing  hard  for  increases  in  the
budget. So we heard from both sides of that.
39  But I should say something about Congress and the services: especially the senior civilian
leaders in the services don't have heavy contact with Congress on the budget. It's done
largely out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some of the senior military leaders
do because Congress likes to talk to the military, so they'll want to hear from the Chief of
Staff and some of the senior leaders, but not so much the senior civilians. 
40  Now when I got to OSD it was a very different story. I  was constantly working with
Congress either on the Hill or dealing with them because OSD does most of that, but less
so in the Air Force. I think I only testified a few times, even in seven years, a handful of
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times. And mostly on things like audits, improper payments, financial management and
problems, as opposed to the real budget. In contrast, I testified maybe 40 or 50 times,
including joining the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff when I was at OSD as a
backup witness during their main budget testimony. So, not as much involvement on the
Hill and certainly nothing like what happened at OSD.
41 Q: Fair enough. Still it’s also illustrative to see what happens at OSD. Did you hear much
from the administration or the Office of Management and Budget, or did that still flow
through the Secretary of Defense?
42 A:  Well  almost  all  the  liaison with OMB is  handled by OSD.  Very little  contact  with
military or civilians. I mean occasionally, but not much. So, I was constantly in touch with
OMB as OSD comptroller, not very much as the Air Force comptroller. The same for CBO. I
had been at  CBO for  16 years  and was aware of  their  studies.  But,  as  the Air  Force
comptroller, there wasn't any day-to-day contact like when I was in OSD, except on a
personal level.
43 Q: Okay, fair enough. Why don't we get into some specifics from the period? I'm just going
to go through basically the questions I had sent you in order but if there's something else
that jumps in we can cut out.
44 Did the government shutdowns have an effect—
45 A: [laughs] Yes.
46 Q: Can you tell me a bit about that?
47 A: Well, there were actually two shutdowns. I had to refresh my memory on this one, too.
I sure do remember the 2013 one intimately because I oversaw that process for DoD.
There were two shutdowns [in 1995], one occurred in November for almost 10 days; I
wrote down the dates somewhere, for 6 or 7 days. DoD was shut down because we didn’t
have an appropriation. The absence of appropriation generally generates a shutdown,
and then there is a very limited number of things you can legally do. Essentially you can
take actions to protect property or ensure the safety of life. DoD interprets that pretty
broadly,  and  is  allowed  to.  So  all  the  ongoing  military  operations,  named  military
operations, were allowed to continue. We probably had close to half our civilians and
essentially  all  of  our  military working.  But  you  were  constantly  confronted  by  the
question: can I do this legally or not? So, it was a very busy period. Political appointees
are exempt from the shutdown, so I was working. It was not nearly as chaotic and busy
for me as the sixteen days in 2013 [laughs]. 
48  There was a longer second shutdown that occurred from mid-December to January—
from December 15th,  '95 to January 6th,  '96.  It  didn't  affect  DoD because we got  an
appropriations bill. So, we were basically trying not to be smug, but were going about our
normal business during that one, which was long and difficult for the civilian agencies.
49 Q:  Along similar lines,  was there a shift  in priorities  or pressures after the midterm
elections?
50 A:  Well,  we  were  basically  in  the  executive  branch,  but  obviously  Congress  has  an
important role to play and as the Republicans took over, I think there was more pressure
in favor of higher defense budgets. Republicans generally favor higher defense budgets.
They certainly did during that period of time, so there was more pressure from them to
increase the budget.  This  is  awkward for  the political  appointees  in the military.  Of
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course we'd be very happy to have more money, but we also work for the president. So in
the end there is a certain amount of awkwardness.
51 Q: Interesting. Similarly, although this might have fallen before you took office, but the
handling of early Clinton interventions/non-interventions in Somalia, and also Haiti—
52 A: Yeah, well, Somalia occurred—that was Aspin's tenure. I wasn't there at the time. I was
still at CBO. I can't remember when the Haiti one was.
53 Q: Well, there was a non-event in late ’93 and then there was finally the actual, non-
intervention, but political settlement like a year later.2
54 A: I mean, for the most part the financial management community doesn't get heavily
involved in those events.  I  knew about them once I  got there because I  was in staff
meetings where they were being discussed. But it wasn't a part of my day-to-day life. In
contrast  to  something  like  the  Bosnian  war  where  we  were  moving  money  around
constantly to try to support it. There, there was day-to-day financial involvement. 
55 Q: Why don't you tell me a little bit about that, then, how the money actually gets shifted.
56 A: Yeah. First, you get an appropriation from Congress. It's in pots of money. They're
fairly small. Although the operating pots are bigger than the modernization pots, and it’s
the  operating  dollars  that  are  at  issue  when  you  find  yourself  going  to  war.  Some
command is flying a lot and so they're going to need more money. You have to find
sources for that. And then follow the rules: for small transfers you can do them without
Congressional approval so long as Congress hasn't specifically said, "Don't do this". For
larger transfers you have to go through a process called reprogramming, where you go to
the Hill and say, "Here’s what I want to do: I want to move money from A to B, is that
okay?" and all the committees have to approve it. It's a time consuming process, both in
terms of justifying it and getting it through all the wickets. But an absolutely critical
process, especially if you find yourself in war. 
57  The 90s were calm compared to what we went through in those five years when I was the
OSD comptroller.  We were moving 8-10 million dollars  a  year,  and it  raised a  lot  of
eyebrows on the Hill. But I was up there saying, "Guys, we're in a war. And you’ve got to
let  me do this  or we're not  going to be able to support  the troops." Well,  "grumble
grumble, why didn't you think of it?" "Cause I'm not foresighted enough to predict a war
two years in advance?" Well, I didn't say that, but these things were understood. So, day-
to-day involvement. 
58  Still, it was interesting to sit in the staff meetings even though I wasn't involved in some
of them. I particularly remember the Bosnian conflict when they were very concerned
about getting munitions to where they needed them. And I remember a couple of staff
meetings where the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was almost down to saying, "Okay,
where is this ship right now and what exactly does that one have?" or "When's it going to
get there?" Because they were so concerned about running out of the kind of munitions
that they needed to pursue the air war in Bosnia. Money wasn't a big issue at that point. I
mean, we just made sure they had enough money to pay the ship costs, but that was
small. But the logistical problems were significant.
59 Q:  Do  you  think  those  were  just  from the  specific  experience  it  was,  or  were  they
exacerbated by the previous drawdown or reductions?
60 A: Probably some of both. Certainly, it was brought about because nobody can know in
advance exactly what you're going to need and where you're going to need it. That was
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the major problem. But the drawdown had meant purchasing fewer munitions. They tend
to  cut  back buying munitions  when they're  not  in  a  war  time period and trying to
drawdown budgets because they're trying to keep the big ticket stuff going. So I suspect
we bought fewer of them. And we used a fair number of them.
61  We’re having even bigger problems now. They're running short of, especially some of the
expensive precision-guided munitions, and are screwing around buying them as quickly
as they can because they're using them so heavily in places like Syria.
62 Q: So here's something I want to pinpoint, as long as we're on the subject, you said it
seems typical you cut munitions and not big ticket items. Is there is a reason why that's
the case? Why you would cut munitions rather than bombers for example?
63 A:  Some of  it  I  suppose is  simply that  it's  probably the lazier  option.  You're buying
hundreds of munitions, usually. In a drawdown, if you're buying 250, you can go down to
200 or even 175 and, it’s probably not efficient, but the production lines are going to
continue. They're not going to close down. If you're only buying a couple dozen jets, you
don't  want  to  cut  back  very  much because  you really  will  have  effects  on  the  line.
Munitions are really the pointy end of the spear for the military, so in the end they'll
probably buy the munitions because they know it’s not useful to have the planes without
something to arm them with. But, if they can't see that problem at hand they're going to
keep buying the big stuff. If you look at it, about 50% of DoD’s modernizations budget is
smaller items. It’s not anything that most people would know about. The other half are
the big ticket items. If you look at the cuts in what I call non-major procurement, they're
always larger during a drawdown period.
64 Q: I feel like that would adversely affect readiness more than some other things, but—
65 A: Well, I mean, they can't go too far. And I suspect—I haven't looked at it recently—I
suspect, I know we're buying more munitions because I just said they're running short of
some of them and I think they realized how important they are. But you know, when
you're in the 90s, we didn't fight much, fortunately. Bosnia was fairly short, and those
other  interventions  were tiny.  Nothing like  what  happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.
When you're in a period of relative peace, you know, there's a tendency to say, "well, we
can cut  that  line back for a  couple of years and make sure we buy more F-16s” for
example. It's probably not a bad decision; you just can't go too far.
66 Q: Within the Air Force what were the items that were most valued or most fought for? I
feel like you must have had your finger on the pulse of that a little bit, in that particular
period.
67 A: Well, the Air Force is usually run by fighter pilots. So aircraft are certainly a key. I
think there was a growing realization that we can’t fight without satellites anymore,
especially all the communications satellites with GPS. But it's not called the Air Force for
nothing. I think aircraft are still  the primary thing. Probably fighters. But the people
running the Air Force, although they may be fighter pilots and their heart is in a cockpit,
they understand that you need a balance of forces. So for example, right now, I think if
you ask the Air Force, they would have said—at least until a couple of years ago when the
F-35 fighter came along—their highest priority was the tanker. Our tanker fleet, the aerial
refueling fleet, was getting quite old. We're buying a new tanker, the KC-46, and they
would have said it's their highest priority aircraft because they understood they needed it
to fight and all of the services do. So I mean, they're responsible, but their hearts are in
aircraft, which are probably the highest priority. 
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68 Q: Getting into some technology questions as you mentioned GPS. I have this impression
that in the 90s there was a faith in high technology, as if it were going to save everything.
69 A: Well,  I  don’t know about save everything, but there was a realization that it  gave
substantial  capability.  I  mean,  GPS is  a  good example.  It  revolutionized not only the
military but the way we all live actually. I used to joke as the comptroller, “If I could just
charge a user fee for GPS I could finance the Air Force out of it,” and I probably could.
And the Air Force is a pretty high tech service. They'll always say that people are the key,
and I think they believe that, but they also recognized that advanced weaponry helped to
keep ahead of prospective enemies.
70  In  the  90s,  that  very  issue  was  being  called  into  question:  who  is  the  near  peer
competitor? The Russians? Their military was decaying to some extent. Not probably as
much as people think,  but it  was.  And China hadn't  begun its march toward a more
sophisticated military, so there were a lot of questions being raised. "Who are you buying
all this stuff to fight?" And I think the answers were mixed. And that's part of the reason
the military budgets didn't fare so well. 
71  Unfortunately these days, you know, if we're not back in the Cold War we're in a hot war,
unfortunately. And the Russians are spending and the Chinese are frightening, and it’s
such a big country. Give it ten or fifteen years, if it decides that what it wants is to have
the world's best military they'll give us a run for our money. They're certainly not there
now, but they’re coming along. They started stealth fighters. They're several generations
behind us, but they're going to make up, and they can steal a lot of what we know and use
it  so  they'll  catch  up  quickly.  I  hope  we  don't  ever  have  to  fight  the  Chinese,  but
unfortunately, I'm afraid that we'll certainly end up in military confrontations with them
I fear.
72 Q: Scary thought.
73 A: Yep.
74 Q: Did broader administration goals of acquisition reform or the reinventing government
movement affect you at the Air Force level?
75 A: I  think they probably were handled more at the OSD level.  I  don't want to sound
cavalier about this, but we've been reforming the acquisition system it seems constantly
for my entire career which now goes back over 4 decades. It's hard to point out major
changes. If you ask me to point to something that occurred during the 90s that I actually
think tangibly improved acquisition it would be the purchase card. In the early 90s, the
military was using paper acquisitions. You want to buy a can of paint, you had to go to a
contracting officer and get a form, a paper form, and you'd take it to a seller they had a
contract with, then you give the store the paper form and they submitted a bill and they
got paid later. I mean, it was a very inefficient process, with huge contracting workforce
and paper flying all over the place. They introduced the purchase card, which is a credit
card that is given to certain people who have authority to purchase, but a large number.
And they can go to wherever they want and buy up to $2500 unless they've got special
authority. And, you know, it just drastically cut down the paperwork. Because all the big
stuff  was  all  still  done by  paper.  But  all  the  little  stuff,  you could  get  it  faster  and
everybody loved it. 
76  The only problem is that a few people misused the thing to buy for personal use. Some of
them—one story, I can't remember. They also introduced a travel card at the same time, a
Visa card. And everybody had that, and there were a lot of problems there. You get 18
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year olds and most of them are going to be fine, but a few of them went out and, you
know, paid for whores with it or something. I mean, we had all kinds of problems with it.
77  But that purchase card, I think, has fundamentally saved money. 
78  As did the travel card. We used to do everything with cash. I remember visiting bases in
the Air Force. They'd have a million to two million dollars in cash in their vaults. And this
is in the 90s so that’s probably twice that amount now. Now they probably have none. Or
they have a few hundred dollars for real emergencies maybe. Of course, if you have two
million dollars sitting there you've got to have people to take care of it. You've got to
have somebody to be logging that money in and out. It's got to have security. So we had a
lot of people handling cash. All of that's gone now. So, I think the travel and purchase
cards, and in terms of acquisition reform, the purchase card, were one of the few things I
can really point to and say absolutely that was a good idea.
79 Q: When were those introduced?
80 A: Early 90s. John Hamre was the comptroller at the time and he was—I don't remember
the exact date—he was pushing their introduction. Frankly, the military leaders hated
them because—and I can't blame them—when somebody misused the card then the base
commander or his legal staff had to get involved and now there's a trial-like process, if it
was a serious misuse. There were some funny situations, too. I remember this story, I
think it was Arizona. Anyway, they got a report that somebody had gone to a bar and
bought a horse with a purchase card.
81  Everybody said, "Oh Shit!”
82  Well it turns out that—I forget some parts of this story—they were trying to work with
the Border Patrol and they couldn't use cars for some reason. You’ve got to do whatever
they were going to do on a horse. The guy said, "Okay, I know a guy that's got a horse,
let’s  go to the bar over there,  we'll  sign the paperwork over there,  I'll  give you my
purchase card and so" [laughs]. It turned out it was an entirely legitimate transaction.
But, you know. I think most private companies were a lot easier going about this. 
83 Q: Interesting. Otherwise you didn't feel like there was much impact from— 
84 A: I didn't notice it.
85 Q: Even from the middle of the service level, not much notice?
86 A: Yeah. You know, when I came into being the Air Force comptroller, I really only knew
the budget. I didn't know much about financial management. I quickly realized that I
could probably do more to help the Air Force financial community by working some of
the financial management, that is, the execution issues. I certainly paid attention to the
budget but there are a whole lot of people that were paying attention to that. There were
a lot fewer paying attention to execution. So I tried to put in place some new systems to
help  handle  some  of  the  transactions  in  a  more  automated  manner.  We  set  up  an
organization that provided advice, it was kind of a center where managers could go for
advice on particularly difficult issues. They could phone somebody and try to resolve a lot
of the small problems in financial execution we were having.
87 Q: Like what? If you don't mind illustrating.
88 A: Oh, improper payments. The government is—this is overly simplistic to say it—but
fundamentally if you're in the private sector you can do anything, financially you can do
anything that you want unless it’s illegal. In the government it's kind of the opposite. You
can only do it if it’s legal; that is, if Congress has passed a law. That's a little simplistic,
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because obviously they pass so many laws that are broad and they don't revisit every
transaction by any means. But it's a fundamentally different mindset. So, we'd get into
situations where people  had either  misused a  travel  card or  a  purchase card or  the
bookkeeping processes. We were pretty paper oriented in the 90s—they’re much more
automated now—so mistakes would happen. Somebody would mispost a transaction to a
certain account.  And then the real  transaction came in and essentially overdrew the
account. That's called a "negative unliquidated obligation" or NULO—sounds like some
kind of African animal. So we were looking for ways to streamline our handling and cut
down on the errors so we had fewer of these things. And we had billions of dollars of
accounts that were overdrawn. When you did all the research generally it turned out "oh
yeah, that's a wrong transaction, it should have gone over there,” and then everything
was fine, but somebody had to take the time to sort through all the paper. DoD does about
150 million accounting transactions a year. And the Air Force probably does, oh, 30 or 40
million. When you're doing those kinds of volumes even a 1 or 2% error rate is a big
problem. And sometimes the error rates were higher. You had to have a huge staff sorting
all this stuff out. So we were looking for ways to cut down on the paperwork and reduce
the number of errors. We had some success. They’re having more now.
89 Q:  In  terms  of  these  reform  effort,  and  going  along  with  these  other  points,  you
mentioned in terms of construction of the budget, your comments make this sound like a
bottom-up process: you start with the bases and their requests and it works its way up to
OSD and they send it off. In terms of transformation within the services how does that
function?
90 A: Well  some of it  was bottom-up.  I  use to say to the bases,  "Look,  guys,  everything
doesn't have to be some grand thing from headquarters. If you figure out a better way to
fix aircraft or to maintain them, you know, less rework, etc. you’ve got to do it." But the
major changes tended to be top-down, because they usually require legislative approval.
Which meant that somebody in Washington was going to have to work with Congress. If
it’s bigger, it’s going to affect the whole Air Force or the whole of DoD, it tends to be top-
down.
91 Q: And did reforms permeate sufficiently?
92 A: Yes and no. One of the biggest problems is in an organization: it sounds like you just
tell everybody to do it, it'll happen. Well that's just not true. People don't like to change,
especially if it’s a change that they didn’t propose or that doesn't seem to help them. I'm
trying to give you an example, and I'm going to have to draw on something a little more
recent.
93 Q: That's fine.
94 A: Because I remember them better. But, I think, even back in the 90s, but certainly in the
last  ten  years,  DoD has  been trying  hard  to  do  something  called  strategic  sourcing.
Essentially, it’s a fancy word that says they gather together all their purchases. If you're
purchasing certain kinds of  IT equipment and you can go to a single or a couple of
vendors with huge orders you're going to get a better price. Purchasing tends to be done
in a disaggregated way at the lower commands; they’re all out doing their own thing. For
example, that purchase card causes wide dispersion among businesses. And that's not all
bad. But if  you think you can save a lot of money, then you've got to get everybody
together and say, “Okay, we're all going to buy from one contract and/or a couple of
contracts and we'll compete it at the Air Force level." Well no one really wants to do that
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because now they don't control exactly what they get, and they kind of liked the vendor
they had, and I mean, they had a personal relationship. It's very difficult to get people to
do that. Closing down service centers is another example. DoD has an incredible number
of service centers. I want to say it’s hundreds, if not thousands. And it doesn't make any
sense. I mean you want to have enough so you’ve got redundancy, but it's much more
efficient to operate a dozen big ones than a hundred medium or small ones. But people
don't want to lose their service center, "Well, then how do I know I'm going to get that
service?" So those kind of things have to be top-down, and they're difficult to implement. 
95  People ask why government isn't efficient. That's part of the reason. Although I see some
of that in big companies too. You know, everybody kind of wants their own. I had a good
friend who is a vice president at Exxon Mobile. When I would describe the kind of things
that I was describing he said it was same thing at Exxon. Everybody wants their own
servers. They want their own thing; they want to control their own. The difference is
though there's a boss and if they ever get into profit problems, they're all going to change
in  order  to  protect  the  company.  It's  not  going  to  happen  at  Exxon  but  at  other
companies. DoD never really had profit problems. Modest problems of budget cutbacks.
But, nothing like a company going through a transformational experience.
96 Q:  Fair  enough.  Were there any key pieces of  top down legislation or administrative
guidance that you felt really had an effect in your time there?
97 A: Ehhh…Well, the budgets obviously. I know that's not what you're looking for. DoD runs
with budgets. And the fact that they were coming down in real terms significantly affects
almost everything we did. I can't think of a single piece of legislation that in the financial
area at any rate that had those kinds of effects.
98 If you look at the history of the defense budget. If you put it in constant dollars back to
1950. It's a roller coaster pattern with peaks, usually wartime periods—Vietnam, Iraq,
Afghanistan. The Reagan era was the exception because there was a peak there, even
though that was a period of relative peace. And there are an equal number of valleys. And
we're talking about one of the valleys in the 90s. 
99 I  would argue that the budget is  driven basically by threats to national security and
foreign policy. 
100 You know, in the good times, you fix all the bases. In the early 2000s all of a sudden they
went from not having enough money to the bases looking great. Right now we're going
right back down the same path again. They're starting to short them again. We're not
spending nearly enough on military construction to keep up the facilities. You can get
away with that for a while, but you know, we're headed back in the same direction. 
101 Q: That always seems to be a recurrent theme. Obviously this is a bit glib, but the only
good thing about war is the construction budget you end up getting.
102 A: Well, it's true. You know, it's not a good reason to have one, certainly. I wonder if we're
going to have periods without wars. It just seems…
103  You know I often think back: it was Bob Reischauer, who headed the CBO in the late ‘80s,
who made that comment to me, "what're you going to do now we won't need a military?"
and how wrong he was. I never would have imagined that. However, I remember reading
an article,  “you're going to miss the Cold War,”3 and thinking,  "right,  nine thousand
missiles pointed at us." I  don't know that I  miss it,  but things aren't all  that much—
militarily I think things are much more difficult now than they ever were during the Cold
War.
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NOTES
1. “Drawdown” is a regularly used term to describe post-war reductions within the
Department of Defense. Can apply to smaller budgets, manpower or both. The 1990s were
the post-Cold War drawdown.
2. USS Harlan County retreated from Haiti in October 1993; US negotiators reached a
settlement to end the Cedras junta and return President Aristide to power in October
1994.
3. Reference to an article by John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,”
The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2 (August 1990): 35-50.
AUTHOR
MICHAEL STRICOF
Michael Stricof est doctorant contractuel « fléché Institut des Amériques » au Laboratoire
d’Études et de Recherche sur le Monde Anglophone (LERMA, EA 853) d’Aix-Marseille Université,
coordinateur du pôle Washington de l’IdA et chercheur invité à Georgetown University. Sa
recherche porte sur la politique des dépenses militaires après la guerre froide. Sa thèse: « Les
dividendes de la paix et la reconversion de la défense pendant l’administration Clinton,
1993-2001 » est sous la direction d’Isabelle Vagnoux. mstricof@gmail.com
Managing Defense after History’s End: A Conversation with Robert F. Hale, Ass...
IdeAs, 11 | Printemps/Été 2018
13
